Mandate premise

A guarantee institution can appear sound while risk is still migrating quietly through its portfolio. Fees arrive before losses mature; an origination partner may control the information used to approve a guarantee; and claims can expose weaknesses that were embedded several cycles earlier. This Board therefore seeks an Independent Director capable of governing risk that is contingent, delayed and shared across institutions.

The successful candidate will help establish whether the organisation is genuinely absorbing risk that advances productive finance or merely accumulating poorly observed tail exposure. The Director's task is to strengthen the quality of judgement at the intersection of additionality, portfolio performance, claims discipline, partner behaviour and capital sustainability.

The portfolio thesis to be tested

The Board expects the appointee to interrogate who benefits from each guarantee programme, what market failure it addresses, how risk is divided, and what behaviour the cover may encourage in the originating institution. Approval volumes are not an adequate measure of success. Management should be able to show whether the guarantee changed access, pricing, tenor or collateral conditions for the intended borrower population—and whether the resulting credit performance remains within an explicitly approved risk-bearing capacity.

The Director will examine portfolio construction across borrower type, geography, lender, channel, product, vintage and correlated economic drivers. Particular attention should be paid to hidden concentrations created when differently labelled programmes depend on the same repayment source. Stress tests must connect macroeconomic and sector assumptions to probability of claim, recovery timing, liquidity demand and capital depletion.

Claims are a governance window

Claims should reveal the quality of the institution's original risk decisions. The Director will seek evidence on notification delays, documentation failures, exclusions, disputed claims, recoveries, partner-level patterns and post-claim learning. A high rejection rate may indicate weak partner controls or unclear programme design; a low rejection rate may reflect insufficient validation. Neither outcome is inherently reassuring.

The Board will expect transparent rules for claim admission, escalation and settlement, with separation between business relationships and adjudication. Where the institution relies on a partner's underwriting, servicing or recovery process, the Director will challenge management to validate the partner's actual practices rather than depend solely on contractual representations.

Capital, pricing and sustainability

The appointee will review whether pricing recognises expected loss, operating cost, concentration, claim volatility and the strategic value of a programme. The institution may choose to subsidise a target segment, but the choice must be explicit, authorised and measurable rather than concealed in optimistic risk assumptions. The Director will test provisioning, reserve methodologies, contingent liabilities, reinsurance or counter-guarantee arrangements, investment liquidity and the credibility of capital-restoration options.

Funding and capital proposals should be evaluated against adverse claims paths, not only a base-case growth plan. The Director will help the Board decide when expansion should slow, when programme terms should change and when an apparently successful partnership no longer meets the institution's risk-adjusted purpose.

Partner and conduct governance

Origination partners, technology intermediaries, collection agencies and data providers can materially shape outcomes without appearing on the institution's balance sheet. The Director will insist on onboarding standards, ongoing surveillance, data rights, audit access, remediation triggers and orderly termination provisions. Incentive structures should not reward volume while transferring deteriorating selection quality to the guarantor.

Borrower communications must explain the guarantee accurately and avoid implying debt forgiveness or protection that does not exist. Complaints, restructurings and recovery practices should be reviewed for fair treatment and for signals that product design is producing harm.

Contribution expected in the first Board cycle

The new Director should help the Board sharpen its portfolio-risk dashboard, define escalation thresholds for claims and partner deterioration, examine the independence of model validation, and clarify the link between programme objectives and capital allocation. The Board also expects constructive participation in succession planning for risk leadership and in strengthening internal audit coverage of programme design, partner reliance and claims.

Candidate standing

Suitable candidates may come from credit risk, development finance, guarantee institutions, insurance, reinsurance, wholesale lending, rating, restructuring or financial-sector regulation. They should have held enterprise-level accountability and be able to challenge actuarial, credit and finance assumptions without turning the Board into a second-line operating committee.

Experience across a full credit cycle, material portfolio stress, claims or recoveries, and institutional partnerships will be valued. Candidates must be free from conflicts involving current lenders, programme partners, borrowers or material service providers. Active registration in the IICA Independent Directors Databank is non-negotiable.